Conflict of Laws

In Damage Suits Related
To Workmen's Compensation Cases*
By Arthur Larson**

Conflicts questions can arise as to two categories of damage suits related
to workmen's compensation cases. The first category is that of suits against
the injured worker's own employer. The second is that of suits against third
parties whose negligence contributed to the causation of the compensable
injury.

I.

EXCLUSIVE-REMEDY DEFENSE OF FOREIGN STATUTE IN
DAMAGE ACTION AGAINST EMPLOYER

All states now have workmen's compensation acts, practically without
exception barring common-law suits against the employer when compensation is available. The question of the applicability of a foreign exclusiveremedy clause of this kind may arise when the injury occurs outside the
United States,' or when common-law actions are permitted under special
conditions which differ from state to state. By far the most common example of this problem occurs because of varying rules as to the availability of
the exclusive-remedy defense to the "statutory employer." ' Thus, the
forum state may immunize the general contractor only when the subcontractor is uninsured, while the foreign state in which compensation is payable may immunize him absolutely.'
It is generally held that, if a damage suit is brought in the forum state
by the employee against the employe;,or statutory employer, the forum
* Adapted by the author from his current revision of A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW, ch. XVI. Copyright 1976 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., and reprinted with

permission.
** James B. Duke Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Oxford University.
(B.A., Jurisp., 1935; D.C.L., 1957). Under Secretary of Labor 1954-1956.
1. Spelar v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). Where
the compensation state bars a tort action and compensation has been paid, a suit cannot be
maintained in that state, since it is against its public policy. Urda v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 211 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1954). The deceased's widow had collected compensation in
Florida and subsequently sued the employer in Florida, under the law of Brazil, which was
the place of injury. Held: the public policy of Florida, evidenced by its compensation act,
barred the action.
2. The term "statutory employer" is frequently used to identify a contractor who by
statute is made liable for compensation to the employee of a subcontractor under him.
3.

See 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §72.31 (1952).
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state will enforce the bar created by the exclusive remedy statute of a state
that is liable for workmen's compensation as the state of employment
relation, contract, or injury.4 Thus, although the local state might give the
affirmative benefit of its own compensation act to this employee, thereby
asserting its right to apply its own statute to the exclusion of the foreign
4. Federal:Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Jonathan Woodner
Co. v. Mather, 210 F.2d 868 (DC. Cir. 1954), discussed in text accompanying note 20, infra.
Mooney v. Stainless, Inc., 338 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1964). Decedent was hired by an Illinois
firm to work in Tennessee. He was killed while working in Tennessee, and the claimant, his
widow, received workmen's compensation benefits in Illinois. Later she attempted to bring a
tort action against the general contractor in Tennessee. Held: Receipt of benefits in Illinois
barred the Tennessee tort action.
Willingham v. Eastern Airlines, 199 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952). Deceased's employment contract specifically stated that the Georgia compensation Act applied. He died in a flight over
Maryland. Georgia compensation law was held to bar widow's damage suit in New York.
Wallach v. Lieberman, 219 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The federal court would not
entertain an employee's action in tort against his employer for injuries resulting from an
accident on U.S. post office and courthouse property.
California:Howe v. Diversified Bldrs., Inc., 262 Cal. App.2d 741, 69 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1968),
discussed in text accompanying note 24, infra.
Missouri: Mitchell v. J. A. Tobin Constr. Co., 236 Mo. App. 910, 159 S.W.2d 709 (1942);
Mangiaracino v. Laclede Steel Co., 347 Mo. 36, 145 S.W.2d 388 (1940), holding in accord with
Yoshi Ogino case, infra this note under New York.
Nevada: Biner v. Dynalectron Corp., 85 Nev. 539, 458 P.2d 616 (1969). Claimant was hired
in Nevada and injured there. The employer had not secured compensation coverage in Nevada, but had done so in Texas. Claimant compromised his Texas compensation claim, and
then sought to sue the employer in Nevada for negligence, claiming that Texas law did not
provide coverage in this situation, so that the settlement could be considered as void. Texas
settlement held valid, unless set aside for mistake or some other such reason, and claimant
held estopped to sue in Nevada.
New Jersey: Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958), discussed in text accompanying note 16, infra.
New York: Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., 227 N.Y. 531, 125 N.E. 675 (1920).
New York has even gone so far as to enforce this rule after its own workmen's compensation
board had decided that an injury occurring in North Carolina was noncompensable because
it did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Yoshi Ogino v. Black, 278 App. Div.
146, 104 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1951). The theory was that North Carolina had an independent right
to decide compensability under its own statute, as it has a right to do under Industrial
Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947). The facts showed a prima facie situation indicating an employment injury, since they alleged that plaintiff was injured while travelling in an
automobile at defendant's request, the automobile being driven by a co-employee. Since the
kind of duty of care being alleged by the employee was the kind that only arises out of the
employment relation and in the course of employment, the pleadings established a presumption that compensation was the exclusive remedy. This apparently could not be overcome by
a showing that one jurisdiction had denied compensation, as long as there was another that
might still grant it. This case went to the court of appeals on certified questions. The first
question, whether the New York board's finding that the accident was not under the compensation act was binding on a court in a damage suit, was answered yes. But the question
whether the North Carolina board would be bound by the same finding was left unanswered,
and the appellate division's ruling on the defense was left undisturbed. Yoshi Ogino v. Black,
304 N.Y. 872, 109 N.E.2d 884 (1952).
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statute, it does not follow that the foreign statute will be disregarded when
the employee is trying to get out of the compensation system altogether
and back into the common-law damage system. In other words, the local
state may reserve the right to apply its own statute in order to ensure that
its benefits are conferred on the employee, for when it does this, no irremediable harm can possibly ensue to either of the parties. This refusal to limit
the employee to the affirmative benefits of the foreign compensation act
hurts no one, for if rights exist thereunder they are now no less enforceable
in the foreign state after the first award than before.' But if the defenses
created by the foreign state are not enforced, irremediable harm to the
employer is the result. Because of this distinction, then, a foreign
exclusive-remedy defense to common-law suit against the employer will
usually be honored although, on the same facts, the benefits of the foreign
act would be required to give way to the benefits of the local act, if the
employee chose to pursue his compensation rights locally.
Now, although states may enforce the bar of a foreign statute against a
suit involving an employer, and indeed usually will, this is not to say that,
because of constitutional compulsion, they must. It is now firmly established by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Carroll
v. Lanza' that a state may decline to apply the exclusive remedy provision
of a sister state when different from its own without violating the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.7 In this case the place of contract and of the employee's
residence was Missouri, but the work was done and the injury occurred in
Arkansas. Missouri's compensation act covers out-of-state injuries when
the contract was made in the state. The plaintiff had indeed received 34
weeks of compensation in Missouri. The rule in Missouri is that a general
contractor has the same immunity from suit by the employee of a subcontractor that a direct employer would enjoy.8 But in Arkansas the general
contractor can be sued in tort as if he were a third party. The plaintiff
obtained a judgment in the federal district court,' which was reversed by
the circuit court of appeals on the ground that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause barred recovery."0 The Supreme Court limited the issue sharply to
this constitutional question, saying "we have the naked question whether
the Full Faith and Credit Clause makes Missouri's statute a bar to
Arkansas' common-law remedy."" Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Clapper,
'2 which had indeed held that the state of injury was constitutionally obliged to honor the exclusive-remedy clause of the state of contract,
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
349 U.S. 408 (1955).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274, 121 S.W.2d 153 (1938).
Carroll v. Lanza, 116 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
10. Lanza v. Carroll, 216 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1954).
11. 349 U.S. at 411.
12. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

employee residence, and employer residence, was quickly passed by with
the observation that Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. IndustrialAccident Commission3 had "departed" from it. Pacific Employers had allowed
the state of injury to override the compensation act of the home state for
the purpose of granting benefits under its own compensation statute. From
this the Court concluded that it was a logical step to allow the state of
injury an equal amount of independence in applying its own rules as to
third-party suits and exclusiveness of remedy:
Here it is a common-law action that is asserted against the exclusiveness of the [Compensation Act] of the home State; and that is seized on
as marking a difference. That is not in our judgment a material difference.
Whatever deprives the remedy of the home State of its exclusive character
qualifies or contravenes the policy of that State and denies it full faith and
credit, if full faith and credit is due. But the Pacific Employers Insurance
Co. case teaches that in these personal injury cases the State where the
injury occurs need not be a vassal to the home State and allow only that
remedy which the home State has marked as the exclusive one. The State
of the forum also has interests to serve and protect. Here Arkansas has
opened its courts to negligence suits against prime contractors, refusing
to make relief by way of workmen's compensation the exclusive
remedy. .

.

. Her interests are large and considerable .

. .

. The State

where the tort occurs certainly has a concern in the problems following in
the wake of the injury. The problems of medical care and of possible
dependents are among these, as Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v.
Commission, supra, emphasizes."4
The Supreme Court concludes by making it clear that its decision was
strictly limited to a holding that the constitution did not require Arkansas
to accept Missiouri's exclusive-remedy rule:
Missouri can make her Compensation Act exclusive, if she chooses, and
enforce it as she chooses within her borders. Once that policy is extended
into other States, different considerations come into play. Arkansas can
adopt Missouri'spolicy if she likes. Or, as the PacificEmployers Insurance
Co. case teaches, she may supplement it or displace it with another,
insofar as remedies for acts occurring within her boundaries are concerned.'"
The principal post-Carroll case, Wilson v. Faull,'" decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 1958, interpreted Carroll in exactly this
restricted fashion. It concluded that, being free of any constitutional compulsion, New Jersey could approach the matter as a straight choice-of-law
13.
14.

15.
16.

306 U.s. 493 (1939).
349 U.S. at 412-413.
349 U.S. 408 at 413. (emphasis added).
27 N.J. 105. 141 A.2d 768 (1958).
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question and could rest its decision on considerations of comity and of
basic compensation policy as affecting choice of law. Following this approach, New Jersey chose to apply Pennsylvania's stricter exclusiveremedy clause with the effect of barring a suit in New Jersey for an injury
occurring in Pennsylvania.
The problem was once more the result of a difference in the immunity
accorded to a statutory employer. Pennsylvania makes the general contractor absolutely liable for compensation, and makes this remedy against
him exclusive in all cases. 7 New Jersey, however, makes the general contractor liable for compensation and immune to suit only if the subcontractor is uninsured. Thus, if the subcontractor is insured, the general contractor is suable as a third party. In this instance, the subcontractor was
insured; indeed, the employee had already obtained an award of compensation in New Jersey against the subcontractor. He then instituted a suit
for damages against the general contractor in New Jersey.
In this case, unlike Carroll, the state of the forum was not the state of
injury. The state of injury was Pennsylvania, which was also the situs of
the work. However, the contract of employment was made in New Jersey,
thus making New Jersey's compensation statute apply, and the employee's
residence was in New Jersey.
The Appellate Division had approached the question by saying that the
issue was essentially not one of tort law but one of regulation of employment relations; therefore, it said, the law of New Jersey should apply, since
its contacts bearing on employment relations were significantly greater
than those of Pennsylvania - residence and place of business of contractor
and subcontractor, residence of employee, place of contract with the employee, and place where the employment relation was originally created."
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, however, came at the question from
an entirely different angle. The problem, it said, was not one of merely
classifying the substantive field as one, say, of tort or of employment
relations, with a mechanical application of the law of a particular state
according to the field thus chosen. Rather, the court started with the
purpose of compensation acts, which was to substitute a limited but certain remedy for the former remedy in tort - a compromise benefiting both
employer and employee. If only the affirmative payment of compensation
is involved, any state having a substantial interest could provide compensation without violating this central principle of compensation law. But if
the exclusive-remedy clause is not respected, this interferes with the fundamental quid pro quo, which is the heart of compensation philosophy.
The court said: "Pennsylvania seeks to effectuate the same basic compensation policy as New Jersey - certainty of remedy and absolute but lim17.
18.

Swartz v. Conradis, 298 Pa. 343, 148 A. 529 (1929).
Wilson v. Faull, 45 N.J. Super. 555, 133 A.2d 695 (1957).
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ited and determinate liability."' 19
The difference in detail between the law of the two states as to the exact
person who is primarily liable did not change the basic consensus on the
policy of exclusiveness. Hence the Pennsylvania rule was not obnoxious to
New Jersey, and "on principles of comity" should be given effect in New
Jersey. The choice of law, then, should not be based upon any concept of
predominance of "contacts," but upon broader considerations of fundamental compensation policy, with a view to fairness to both parties.
The court relied heavily on a strikingly similar case similarly decided by
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia: Jonathan Woodner Co.
v. Mather.20 The employee resided in the District of Columbia and was
there employed by the subcontractor, who was insured both in the District
and in Maryland. The job site, the general contractor, and the injury were
in Maryland. In Maryland the general contractor has the immunity of a
direct employer; in the District he has it only if the subcontractor is uninsured. Without applying for compensation in either place, the employee
sued the general contractor in tort in the District. The court began by
stating that compensation could be awarded in either jurisdiction.
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper2 was then briefly noted; the court
observed that it had been severely eroded, but that the erosion had been
in the form of cases permitting affirmative compensation awards and thus
enlarging the benefits of compensation acts. The court said it would not
rest its decision entirely on the Full Faith and Credit ground under
Bradford - which was fortunate, since five months later the Supreme
Court in Carroll destroyed that ground altogether. Rather the court turned
to "established principles of conflict of laws." It invoked the doctrine that
the law of the place of injury governed the character of the tort, and
therefore the law of Maryland had barred this tort at birth." In addition,
much was made of the argument, later picked up in Wilson v. Fault, that
the balance of interests between employer and employee on which compensation theory rests would be upset if the claimant could sue the employer
at common law while simultaneously having a compensation right against
him elsewhere.
This argument appears to be the best all-purpose ground for enforcing
the exclusive-remedy clause of a foreign state. The alternative argument,
that since the state of injury controls the law of the tort there never was a
tort liability, has the disadvantage that it would work only when the facts
fall into the Wilson or Woodner configuration, with the state of injury
19. 141 A.2d at 778. See also Mooney v. Stainless, Inc., discussed supra in note 4 under
Federal, in which the court stressed that the Carroll type of problem did not arise since both
states agreed on the principle of exclusiveness of the employer's liability for compensation.
20. 210 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
21. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
22. Weintraub, J., concurring in Wilson v. Faull, N.15 supra, would have put the decision
on this simple ground: No tort liability ever came into existence in Pennsylvania.
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being the foreign state. But if the state of injury were the forum state, as
in Carroll, and had the more permissive third-party provision, the argument that the tort liability never arose would not apply. The argument
addressed to compensation philosophy could apply in any combination,
however, and on Carroll facts a local court could say that it should apply
the bar to carry out the overall policy of compensation law of balancing
the interests of employer and employee.
When the issue is whether the state can grant affirmative compensation
benefits, the question is not a true choice-of-law question, since the only
choice before the local tribunal is to grant relief under its own statute or
deny relief altogether.13 But when the issue involves third party suits growing out of compensable injuries, true choice-of-law problems arise. The
local court might choose whether to apply its own exclusive-remedy clause
or that of a foreign state. Accordingly, this branch of law has unavoidably
been caught up in the notoriously tangled and stormy story of choice-oflaw theory generally. One thing, at any rate, is clear: Since Carroll these
cases are not to be decided on Full-Faith-and-Credit grounds. But this still
leaves several options. One is the conceptual lex loci approach, rejected in
Wilson, but employed in Woodner and the concurring opinion in Wilson,
that the law of the place of the tort controls its characteristics and indeed
its existence. More fashionable lately are the theories of "significant contacts" and "legitimate interests." But these, while they serve well enough
when the question is one of supplying affirmative compensation benfits,
seem less cogent when the question is one of permitting a common-law
recovery to be superimposed on an admitted compensation remedy. Thus,
the possibility that an injured worker may run up medical bills in the state
of injury gives that state an interest in seeing that he gets an adequate
workmen's compensation award, as the Pacific Employers Insurance Co.
decision stressed. But, assuming that the worker is assured of having his
medical bills paid and of receiving income benefits under workmen's compensation, the realistic question in a tort case is: Has this state an interest
in adding something further to this assured medical and income benefit?
Put in this way, the interest begins to look rather thin, if not fictitious.
The California Court of Appeals followed this line in a case in which the
"interest" of the state was stretched about as thin as it could get: Howe
v. Diversified Builders, Inc.24 The only "contact" of California with the
case was that the defendants were California corporations. Everything else
was in Nevada: the employee's residence, the contract, and the place of
work and injury. Nevada law makes subcontractors employees for compensation purposes, while California law does not. After receiving a Nevada
23. See detailed discussion of this question, including an analysis of the impact of Crider
v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965), at 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§84.20, hereinafter cited as LARSON.
24. 262 Cal. App.2d 741, 69 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1968).
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compensation award (which he attempted to "rescind"), the employee
sued the defendants in California. The court began by agreeing that under
California law the law of the place of wrong was not necessarily controlling,
and that in complex situations involving multi-state contacts the significant interests of the particular states should be consulted. As the court
framed the issue, it was whether California, merely as the home of the
defendant corporation, has an "interest in extending to Nevada residents
greater rights than are afforded by the state of their domicile." In answering this rather self-answering question, the court observed: "However, as
previously indicated, no California 'interest' would be promoted by impairing the ability of California corporations to compete for business in other
states by imposing upon them obligations to the residents of such states
which those states do not impose upon foreign corporations or their own
domestic corporations. "'
Oregon has supplied an interesting case, Davis v. Morrison-Knudsen
Co.,"5 illustrating the transition from a lex loci approach to a "significant
contacts" approach. It is also of unusual interest because it is one of the
very few cases in this area not stemming from differences in the immunity
of statutory employers. The plaintiff was an Oregon resident, who was
hired in Oregon to work at a construction site in both Oregon and Idaho.
Most of his work was in Oregon, although lately about 90% of it had been
in Idaho. The plaintiff was injured on the job while driving in Idaho, which
has a complusory compensation act. Oregon has an elective act, and the
employer had elected not to be covered. The plaintiff filed a compensation
claim in Idaho and received some benefits. The compensation act of Oregon was also clearly applicable to the injury. The plaintiff then sought to
sue his employer in Oregon, as a nonelecting employer. The defendant
relied principally on two cases holding suits in Oregon barred when the
injury arose in a sister state, Washington, that barred third-party suits
against employers. 7 But the court pointed out that the lex loci rule of those
cases in Oregon had given way to the rule "that the law of the state which
has the most significant contacts with the occurrences and the parties is
determinative of all rights and liabilities."' 8 The court adds:
25. 69 Cal. Rptr. at 59.
26. 289 F. Supp. 835 (D. Ore. 1968).
27. Williamson v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 221 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1955). Deceased, a
regular employee in Oregon, was killed while in Washington. Compensation was awarded in
Oregon, which did not bar the third-party suit. Suit was instituted in a federal court in
Oregon. The Washington law prohibits third-party suits against all employers. Held: Washington law applied, since at the situs of the injury there was no action for the tort, the Oregon
act was presumptively territorial, the Washington law set the limitations on its employer's
liability, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires Oregon to give full faith and credit
to the laws of Washington.
Nadeau v. Power Plant Eng'r Co., 216 Ore. 12, 337 P.2d 313 (1959). The Oregon worker
was injured while temporarily in Washington. The court held that since the Washington act
applied, no damage suit could be entertained in Oregon.
28. 289 F. Supp. at 837. See also Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co., 247 Ore. 274, 428
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The court has listed the following factors as important in determining
the state of most significant relationships: (a) the place where the injury
occurred; (b) the place where the conduct occurred; (c) the domicile,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.2
Since the only contract with Idaho was driving there and returning, the
court had no difficulty in finding that Oregon was the jurisdiction where
the parties had the most significant contacts. Accordingly, the tort suit was
held to lie under Oregon law. The court then cited and distinguished
Wilson and Woodner, observing the Oregon courts would not follow them
on the facts of this case. This seems clear enough, since the central rationale of both Wilson and Woodner was that both jurisdictions in each case
shared a common policy of according an employer immunity from
common-law suit in exchange for his assuming the burdens of compensation liability. In the Oregon situation, the employer had not assumed any
compensation burdens in Oregon. Indeed, it is a near-universal principle
of compensation law that the non-electing employer should be subject to
common-law suit. One reason is to impel him to elect coverage. If, in a case
such as the present, the court relieved him of his liability, not because he
had elected coverage in Oregon, but because some foreign state had subjected him to compulsory coverage, Oregon's own policy of providing an
incentive to elect coverage would be to that extent undercut.
II.

CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS

When compensation is awarded or payable in one state, and a thirdparty action lies in another state, the wide variance between third-party
and subrogation statutes makes it important to ascertain which state's
statute governs the incidents of the third-party suit. The range of possible
third parties, for example, differs sharply from state to state,30 as do the
extent and timing of the insurer's subrogation to the employee's rights on
payment of compensation."
It seems advisable to examine these two sources of conflicts separately.
When the issue is whether the particular class of third-party defendants
is completely immune to suit - as when one state immunizes coemployees, or subcontractors on the same project, or physicians, while the
other does not - the result of the choice of law will ordinarily be an allor-nothing holding that the defendant is or is not suable. But when the
P.2d 898 (1967); DeFoor v. Lematta, 249 Ore. 116, 437 P.2d 107 (1968); and Lilienthal v.
Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
29. 289 F. Supp. at 837.
30.
31.

2 LARSON §72.
2 LARSON §74.
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issue is whether the assignment or subrogation statutes of a sister state
should be given effect, the result is often merely that a particular plaintiff
is granted or denied standing to sue. The cause of action itself is probably
not destroyed, and the proceeds of the suit may well be ultimately distributed in much the same way no matter who the plaintiff is." This type of
case involves a mixture of procedural and substantive rights, while the
cases on who are immune third parties involve purely substantive rights.
In one sense, the first category of cases, those turning on the immunity
of particular third parties, might seem to be closely related to the cases
just discussed, involving the question whether a statutory employer should
be, in effect, treated as a "third party" not immune to suit. But there is
an important difference. If the statutory employer is immune, it is because
he is immune as employer. This being so, the rationale of Wilson and
Woodner can be pressed into service, stressing that the defendant as employer is within the central policy of compensation law according immunity to employers as a quid pro quo for shouldering compensation liability.
But no such rationale is available when the issue is whether the defendant
should be immune as co-employee, or as unrelated subcontractor on the
same job, or as physician. Some other choice-of-law theory must be found
for these cases.
There is one carryover, however. The scope of Carroll v. Lanza33 is broad
enough to suffuse all the third-party suit cases in this article. That is, the
decison on whether to enforce a bar imposed by a sister state, against a
statutory employer, a co-employee, or anyone else, is no longer to be made
on constitutional considerations of full faith and credit, but on choice-oflaw grounds free of constitutional compulsion.
III.

CONFLICTS AS TO IMMUNITY OF PARTICULAR THIRD PARTIES

The closeness of the legal issue in this class of cases, and the contrast in
possible approaches, is starkly exposed by a comparison of two decisions,
one by the Supreme Court of New Jersey and one by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, reaching diametrically opposite results on substantially
identical facts.
In Stacy v. Greenberg," the New Jersey case, the plaintiff was traveling
32.

2 LARSON §74.30.

33. 349 U.S. 408 (1955), discussed in the text accompanying note 6, supra.
34. 9 N.J. 390, 88 A.2d 619 (1952). See Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 57 Wis.2d 588, 204
N.W.2d 897 (1973). Hunker and a co-employee, both Ohio employees of an Ohio corporation,
traveled to Wisconsin in the course of their employment and were there injured in an automobile accident with a Wisconsin resident, Brown. Hunker brought an action for negligence
under Wisconsin's direct action statute against Brown's automobile liability insurer and also
against the insurer of the Hertz Rent-A-Car (Royal Indemnity) and alleged that the negligence of both his co-employee and the Wisconsin resident was the cause of his injuries.
Hunker had received a workmen's compensation award under Ohio law. The insurance companies contended that Ohio law, which barred third-party suits against a co-employee, was
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through New Jersey from a work site in Pennsylvania to his home and
employment base in New York. The defendant employer was a New York
corporation, and the contract of employment had been made in New York.
The car was being driven by a co-employee, through whose alleged negligence the plaintiff was injured. New Jersey, where the tort suit against the
co-employee was brought, permits tort suits against co-employees; New
York does not. The court held that the bar imposed by the New York
compensation statute should be respected, and the defense was upheld.
Seventeen years later the Maryland case of Hutzell v. Boyer35 was decided. Here the place of work and the place of contract were both in
Virginia. However, the plaintiff and his co-employee, whose negligent driving allegedly caused the accident, lived in Maryland, and the employer
furnished the transportation to and from the work site. The injury occurred
in Maryland on the homeward trip. The compensation law of Virginia bars
tort suits against co-employees; Maryland law does not. A tort suit against
the co-employee was held maintainable in Maryland. Stacy v. Greenberg
was discussed, but its holding was simply rejected. "We make no attempt
to reconcile the Stacy case with our own decision in the instant case, ' ' 36 said
the court.
One of the most significant similarities between the two cases is that in
each one it is clear that the compensation act of the state of injury and
forum did not apply to the injury. In the Maryland case compensation in
Maryland had actually been denied. In the New Jersey case, the court in
its opinion says flatly that the New Jersey compensation act would not
apply. By the same token, it is clear that the compensation act of the
controlling-not Wisconsin law, which had no such bar. The court, holding that Ohio law
applied in an action between Ohio citizens, applied certain "choice-influencing considerations." Ohio law was the more appropriate choice. Its application would induce predictability
of results in that the parties involved in the insurance transaction in Ohio would expect that
Ohio law would be applied to a claim arising under that policy and the Ohio employer would
expect the employee to be limited to the workmen's compensation award that was predictable
in Ohio. The minimal connection of Wisconsin with the accident does not override the interests of Ohio in the implementation of its own concepts of workmen's compensation. Application of Ohio law would not deprive plaintiff of compensation and was not the application of
an outmoded law.
Wayne v. Olinkraft, Inc., 293 So.2d 896 (La. App. 1974). Decedent was a Louisiana resident
employed by a Louisiana trucking firm. The trucking firm was under contract with a logging
operation and was required to provide compensation insurance for decedent. Decedent, while
unloading logs in Arkansas, was killed by the alleged negligence of the logger's employees.
Decedent's suvivors received compensation under the Louisiana Act. Under Arkansas law the
logger was not required to provide insurance and was therefore not immunized from a tort
suit. Decedent's survivors brought a tort suit in Louisiana court asserting Arkansas law. The
court dismissed the suit, holding it barred by the Louisiana Compensation Act, and adopting
§184 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, which accords immunity from tort to the
employer if he is given immunity by a compensation statute of any state under which he is
required to provide insurance.
35. 252 Md. 227, 249 A.2d 449 (1969).
36. 249 A.2d at 454.
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foreign state whose third-party clause was in question did apply in each
instance. The only factual difference - and the Maryland court makes
nothing of it - is that in the Maryland case the state of the forum was
also the state of the employee's residence, which was not true in the New
Jersey case.
In Stacy v. Greenberg, the court reasoned that, since New Jersey was
not even sufficiently involved in the incident to apply its workmen's compensation act, this was not within the class of cases presenting the "complex problem of the application of conflicting workmen's compensation
acts to an accident with which two or more states may have some legitimate concern. . . ."I' The court continued:
Nothing is presented in this situation which is obnoxious to the public
policy of New Jersey. Recognition of the limitations upon plaintiff's rights
of suit against fellow servants imposed by the New York statute can in
no wise be prejudicial to the interests of our State. By making the New
York statute the applicable law in the instant case we merely recognize
that by their conduct plaintiffs have subjected themselves to certain restrictions upon their rights to pursue remedies against their fellow servants incorporated by the New York law into their contracts of
employment. These are substantial provisions of such contracts and create in employers and fellow employees rights of immunity from suit, and
should be enforced by us when not contrary to our public policy."
Note that the court expressly avoids putting the decision on constitutional grounds." Indeed, in the Hutzell opinion, the Maryland court acknowledged this: "Although Stacy was decided prior to the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in Lanza, it is doubtful that knowledge of
it would have influenced the result reached by the Supreme Court of New
Jersey, as that Court did have the benefit of Pacific Employers Insurance
Co. v. IndustrialAccident Commission. 4 oIt is clear that the basis of Stacy
was comity, not constitutional mandate.
In Hutzell, however, the defendant had evidently chosen to make his
stand on the requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This seems
a dubious strategy, what with Lanza having been on the books for over a
decade. The court relied heavily on Lanza, as might have been anticipated.
The "legitimate interest" of the forum state was the same in both instances, that is, the interest of the state of injury "in the welfare of a person
injured within its borders, who may conceivably become a public charge
due to a disabling injury."4 The Maryland court added, "The social and
37. 88 A.2d at 622.
38. 88 A.2d at 623.
39. "Our conclusion makes unnecessary a determination whether, as urged by defendants,
we are required by Article IV, Section I of the Federal Constitution to give effect to section
29 of the New York law." Id.
40. 249 A.2d at 454.
41. Id. at 452.
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economic problems following in the wake of a serious injury as they may
affect the dependents of the person injured are properly matters of public
concern."42
As stressed earlier, Lanza did not compel the Maryland court to reject
the immunity created by Virginia - it merely permitted it to do so if it
chose. The choice itself, although ostensibly clothed in constitutional language of obnoxiousness, is essentially a choice-of-law decision based on
legitimate state interest, buttressed by an old-fashioned invocation of the
lex loci principle "uncomplicated by any consideration of the impact of
divergent workmen's compensation statutes." 3 For the latter point, the
court could have cited Ellis v. Garwood," which was decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio on straight lex loci grounds without even bothering
to mention Lanza.4 5 Note that in Ellis the compensation identification of
the foreign state was, if anything, stronger than that in either Stacy or
Hutzell, since the suit in Ohio was brought after compensation had been
actually awarded in New York.48
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 80 Ohio Abs. 443, 143 N.E.2d 715 (1957), aff'd, 168 Ohio St. 241, 152 N.E.2d 100
(1958). New York residence, injury in Ohio, which unlike New York, does not prohibit suit
against co-employee. Held: Ohio law controls, even though compensation had been awarded
in New York.
Wilson v. Fraser, 353 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1973). Decedents, Maryland residents, employed
in a Maryland Sears store, were killed in Virginia while returning to Maryland from a company dinner in the District of Columbia. The court held that even though compensation
benefits were collected under the Maryland law, Virginia would have applied its law, because
the accident occurred within its borders. Therefore, the provision of the Virginia law that
prohibits negligence actions against a fellow employee in compensable situations applied, and
a wrongful death action by the estate of one employee against the estate of the other employee
was barred. Virginia law was applied because of the Maryland Wrongful Death Statute,
which called for the application of the law of the place of accident.
Sade v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 458 F.2d 210 (10th Cir. 1972). Plaintiff was injured in
Nebraska. He was employed by an Oklahoma corporation, performing contract work with the
defendant, a corporation with its main offices in Nebraska. After injury, plaintiff entered into
a compromise and settlement agreement with defendant, releasing all claims that he had
against defendant as a result of the accident. He then filed a compensation claim in Oklahoma, which in turn was settled by the payment of a lump sum. Plaintiff next sought to bring
a negligence action in Kansas against defendant's employees. This suit was dismissed, on
grounds that the release given to defendant also released the employees. Plaintiff then
brought suit against defendant for fraud, contending that defendant had represented to him
that execution of the release would not affect his rights against defendant's employees. Defendant contended that, among other things, plaintiff had not been induced to give up any
rights, since under Oklahoma law he could not bring suit against defendant's employees. The
court rejected this argument, holding that despite claimant's acceptance of benefits under
the Oklahoma Workmen's Compensation Law, he was not precluded from pursuing additional remedies he had under the laws of Nebraska, where the accident occurred, and therefore was entitled to bring this action for fraud.
45. Lanza was mentioned in the opinion below, but not by the supreme court.
46. For other cases in which compensation had been actually paid, see:
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In all three of these cases, one began with the actual or assumed fact that
compensation would be payable in the foreign state and not in the local
state. But if compensation has not yet been awarded or even sought, and
might be payable in the forum state as well as in the foreign state, the
question becomes much easier. In the leading case, Bagnel v. Springfield
Sand & Tile Co., 7 the place of contract, regular employment, and employer's business were all in New York. The employee was injured on a
temporary assignment in Massachusetts, due, as he alleged, to the negligence of a subcontractor of his employer. The law of New York permits a
third-party suit against such a subcontractor; the law of Massachusetts
does not. Suit was brought in Massachusetts. The court, in a lucid opinion,
reduced the entire question to the issue whether the Massachusetts compensation act was applicable to this injury. On the strength of locus of the
injury alone, the court concluded that it was applicable." The act being
applicable, its third-party provisions also came into play and barred the
action against the subcontractor.
The application of the law of the state where compensation was awarded
or is payable does not always have the effect of cutting down the employeeplaintiff's rights. It may also at times serve to increase his rights, a fact
not to be overlooked by a court that is tempted to spurn the principle of
comity. For example, in an Illinois case, Miller v. Yellow Cab Co.,49 the
plaintiff was a Texas employee of a Texas employer and had been injured
during a temporary business errand in Illinois. Texas, which had awarded
compensation, permits suits against any third party, while Illinois had at
the time the most restrictive kind of third-party statute, prohibiting suit
by the employee against any third person who himself was under the IlliBusby v. Perini Corp., 110 R.I. 49, 290 A.2d 210 (1972). Plaintiff, the employee of a subcontractor, was injured on a job site in Rhode Island. Plaintiff was a Massachusetts resident,
the employer and the general contractor were Massachusetts corporations, and the employment contract was executed in Massachusetts, as was the contract between the general
contractor and subcontractor. Compensation benefits were paid under Massachusetts law,
and plaintiff then brought suit in Rhode Island against the general contractor. Rhode Island
law permits such a suit, Massachusetts law does not. Adopting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §184 (1971), the court held that the exclusive remedy provision of
Massachusetts would be enforced, and affirmed a dismissal of the action.
McKenney v. Capitol Crane Corp., 321 F. Supp. 880 (D.D.C. 1971). Plaintiff was injured
in Maryland while working for a Maryland corporation which conducted almost all of its
business in Maryland. All of plaintiff's work was in Maryland. In addition, plaintiff had
accepted benefits under a final compensation award pursuant to the Maryland Workmen's
Compensation Act. These facts were held to require that Maryland law, rather than that of
the District of Columbia, govern third-party rights concerning the claim.
47. 144 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1944).
48. See 3 LARSON §§87.20 to 87.25.
49. 308 111. App. 217, 31 N.E.2d 406 (1941). Accord, Hynes v. Indian Trails, Inc., 181 F.2d
668 (7th Cir. (1950). See also Standard Oil Co. v. Lyons, 130 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1942).
Compensation had been awarded under Iowa act for injury in Illinois; suit allowed under Iowa
law, although both employers were-"bound by" the Illinois act.
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nois compensation act. Illinois allowed the suit, on the ground that thirdparty rights are fixed by the law of the state granting compensation. The
court also apparently assumed that Illinois would not have awarded compensation if an award had been sought under the Illinois act; 0 accordingly,
its compensation provisions did not come into play at all.
IV.

CONFLICTS AS TO ASSIGNMENT OR SUBROGATION IN FOREIGN STATE

The second major question involving conflicts as to third-party suits
arises most frequently in this form: the law of the state of compensation
assigns the recipient's common-law rights of action to the insurer. The
employee then appears as plaintiff in the courts of the state of injury,
whose laws contain no such assignment provision. It is usually held that
the assignment will be enforced. 5 The assignment worked by the acceptance of compensation is an accomplished fact between the parties. By
respecting it, the court is not giving extraterritorial effect to foreign laws,
but is merely recognizing the adjustment of rights which the parties have
brought about between themselves by their conduct.52 There is, however,
50. Cole v. Industrial Comm'n, 353 I11.415, 187 N.E. 520, 90 A.L.R. 116 (1938).
51. Federal:Alexander v. Creel, 54 F. Supp. 652 (D. Mich. 1944); Dinardo v. Consumers
Power Co., 181 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1950), involving subrogation.
Farnham v. Daar, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 809 (W.D. Mo. 1960). The employee had received
Kansas compensation benefits. He brought suit in Missouri against the third-party tortfeasor.
The court found that while the Missouri statute was predicated on subrogation as a matter
of law, the Kansas statute provided for an assignment of the employee's claim to the employer
one year after the accident. Under a principle of comity, Missouri would apply Kansas law
and the final compensation award in Kansas must be given full faith and credit. Held, the
assignment of a claim against the third party was effective, making the employer rather than
the employee the real party in interest. The case was dismissed without prejudice to the rights
of the plaintiff's employer to prosecute an action against the third party within the Missouri
statute of limitations.
Florida. See United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Reed Constr. Corp., 132 So.2d 626 (Fla.
App. 1961). The Florida Wrongful Death Act had been construed by the Florida courts to
mean that the right of action could not be assigned. The Longshoremen's Act provides for an
assignment of all rights of action against a third party upon the claimant's acceptance of
compensation benefits. The court held that the Longshoremen's Act provisions controlled and
would permit the assignee to bring suit under the Florida Wrongful Death statute.
Illinois: Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., 374 Ill. 506, 30 N.E.2d 14 (1940), involving election.
Ohio: Griffin v. Gar Wood Indus., Inc., 97 Ohio App. 129, 123 N.E.2d 751 (1954). Ohio court
applied the substantive law of Kansas, the situs of the tort, in holding that the one-year
assignment provision of that state barred action by the plaintiff.
52. Sometimes the local court disavows any enforcement of the foreign third-party statute, but gets the same result by asserting its right to enforce the division of the proceeds of
the suit equitably, according to the obligation existing between the parties because of the
employee's acceptance of compensation. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Chartrand, 239 N.Y.
36, 145 N.E. 274 (1924); General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Zerbe Constr. Co., 269 N.Y.
227, 199 N.E. 89 (1935).
See also Hile v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 281 Ala. 388, 203 So.2d 110 (1967). Claimant was
employed by a Wisconsin company to work in Alabama, and was injured in Alabama. Pur-
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some authority to the contrary.13
The majority rule is practical as well as logical, for it prevents possible
double liability of the third party. If he can be sued by the employee in
spite of the statutory assignment of the cause of action to the insurer, he
might also find himself sued again by the assignee-insurer.
In some cases, the local court has recognized the substantive rights
created by the state of compensation, but at the same time has applied
its own procedural rules. Thus, although the plaintiff-employee may have
lost his rights in the state of compensation by assignment, the local state
may, under its procedure, permit him the status of plaintiff, and may even
suant to his contract he received benefits under the Wisconsin act. A third-party suit was
instituted in Alabama and recovery was made. The court held that under the Wisconsin act
the compensation carrier was entitled to reimbursement from the proceeds of the tort action,
regardless of whether or not the employer was obliged to pay claimant under the Wisconsin
Act.
53. Federal: McAvoy v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 187 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. Ark.
1960). The plaintiff brought a third-party suit in a federal court sitting in Arkansas against
two Texas corporations and a California corporation, alleging negligence. The plaintiff was a
resident of Arkansas, injured in Kentucky and hired in Louisiana, which established his right
to receive Louisiana compensation benefits. His admitted receipt of such benefits would,
under the Louisiana statute, bar the third-party tort action. The court found that, under
Arkansas conflict of laws, the place of the injury (Kentucky) controlled the right to recover
in tort, not the place of the employment contract (Louisiana). The conflict of laws of Kentucky might have turned to Louisiana law. Avoiding a renvoi (not to the law of the forum,
but to the law of Louisiana), the court applied the Kentucky substantive law, which permitted the suit against the third-party tortfeasors. The court held that the plaintiffs receipt of
compensation benfits under the Louisiana act did not amount to an "election" to have his
rights to maintain a third-party action determined under the Louisiana law, nor would the
court of Arkansas or Kentucky be required to apply Louisiana law to determine the on whom
tort liability could be imposed. Such a requirement would give extraterritorial effect to an
exclusive-remedy provision of another state's compensation act, contrary to the rule laid
down in Carroll v. Lanza. Action in tort against third-party tortfeasors sustained.
New York: Middle Atlantic Transp. Co. v. State, 206 Misc. 535, 133 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1954).
Employer, having paid compensation under the Michigan law, which assigned the cause of
action to him, sued the third-party tortfeasor in New York. Held: Michigan assignment
provision had no extraterritorial effect. The court noted that New York has a similar assignment provision, but stated that the plaintiffs did not and could not assert the right to
maintain the action by virtue of the New York provision.
For a somewhat related problem, see Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 111 F.
Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953). An employee, subject to the
New York Workmen's Compensation Act, was killed in an airplane accident in the Azores.
Compensation was accepted by his dependents in New York. Then, after the expiration of
the six-month period allowed the dependents to sue the third party in New York, the dependents sued the airline in the federal court sitting in New York claiming, among other damages, "moral damages" under the law of Portugal. The court held that, since the right to
recover "moral damages" (unknown to New York law) could not pass to the carrier, and since
any assignment to the carrier would therefore split the cause of action, the widow's representatives retained the entire cause of action. See also Werkley v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N.V., 110 F. Supp. 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), involving an accident in India.
Wisconsin: Cf. Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 176 Wis. 521, 182 N.W. 852, 187 N.W.
746 (1922).
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rule that the assignee is not a necessary party, but always subject to the
understanding that the recovery is for the benefit of the assignee-insurer.54
Note that in many states the effect of subrogation is not to subtract the
cause of the action from the employee but merely to add it to the insurer;
in this view, the third party is not entitled to raise the subrogation as a
defense at all.55
V.

SUMMARY

If a common-law action against the employer is available in the state of
the forum but barred by the exclusive-remedy statute of a state granting
a compensation remedy for the injury, the state of the forum will usually
enforce the bar on grounds of comity or policy, although it is not bound to
do so by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. As to third-party actions, if
compensation has been paid in a foreign state and suit is brought against
a third party of the state of injury, the substantive rights of the employee,
the subrogated insurance company and the employer are ordinarily held
governed by the law of the foreign state, although there is contra authority.
If no compensation has as yet been paid, but could be awarded just as
properly in the state in which the third-party suit is brought as in the
foreign state, the local statute will control the incidents of the third-party
action.
54. Federal: Betts v. Southern Ry. Co., 71 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1934). See also Magee v.
McNany, 10 F.R.D. 5 (W.D. Pa. 1950). Suit was permitted by an employee in Pennsylvania,
where the accident occurred, although the cause of action had been assigned by operation of
the New York statute to the insurer, partly on the ground that the insurer had expressly
waived the assignment and reassigned the action back to the employee; moreover, the insurer
was also permitted to intervene, and there was no possibility of double recovery.
Delaware: See White v. Metzer, 52 Del. 449, 159 A.2d 788 (1960). The employee was killed
in a seven-car accident in Delaware but was under the New Jersey Compensation Act in view
of his employment relation. Under the New Jersey Compensation Act, the widow could sue
a third party in tort, subject to the partial subrogation rights of the carrier. The Delaware
Wrongful Death statute (DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 10 §3704(b) (1953)) permitted suit by "the
personal representatives"; the Delaware Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 17(a)) required every
action be brought in the name of the real party in interest; and the Delaware Compensation
Act (DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 19, § 2363 (1953)) provided that "any party in interest shall have a
right to join in said suit" brought by the widow against a third-party tortfeasor. The court
held that the different interests of the widow and the subrogee carrier did not constitute a
splitting of the cause of action and the carrier was properly a co-plaintiff as a necessary but
not indispensable party.
Missouri: Scott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 333 Mo. 374, 62 S.W.2d 834 (1933).
New Hampshire: Saloshin v. Houle, 85 N.H. 126, 155 A. 47 (1931).
Washington: Reutenik v. Gibson Packing Co., 132 Wash. 108, 231 P. 773, 37 A.L.R. 830
(1924).
55. See 2 LARSON §75.40. Cf. Black v. Panhandle & Santa Fe Ry., 222 F. Supp. 308 (E.D.
Okla. 1963), aff'd, 326 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1964). Texas compensation carrier's intervention
rights under Texas act enforced in Oklahoma action between injured employee and third
party, since Texas act did not absolutely assign the employee's right of action to the carrier.

